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Fifteen Years Of Fourco--The Needless
Disputes Over Patent Venue
By JAmms W. GERIAK*
THE view attributed to Justice Brandeis that it is more important
that a law be certain than right1 was undoubtedly expressed to dis-
courage quibbling over sterile matters of form or procedure. This view
is recognized, however, as not having universal applicability. The pos-
sible harsh consequences inherent in the Brandeis aphorism are no-
where so apparent as in the frequent, varied and entirely unnecessary
litigation over the nature of patent venue. This litigation has ensued
in the wake of the interpretation of the federal venue statute by the
Supreme Court in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp.2
The reason for this is plain. Fourco is at odds with fundamental no-
tions of good practice and is unfairly adverse to the interests of patent
owners. Accordingly, there have been repeated efforts-some success-
ful and some not-to distinguish, avoid or reinterpret the Fourco hold-
ing.3  The holding of Fourco is that section 1400(b) is the sole and
exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement actions.4
Thus, unlike other special venue statutes, the patent venue statute is not
considered supplemental to the general venue provisions of Title 28;
rather it is considered to be an exception to them.' Such a view is
based on an incorrect analysis of the historical setting of section 1400
(b), serves no policy interest, works injustice which is sometimes se-
vere, and has burdened the courts with unnecessary controversy.
* B. Ch. E., 1956, Renesselaer Polytechnic Institute; LL.B., 1960, Georgetown
University.
1. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (dissenting).
2. 353 U.S. 222 (1957). The patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)
(1970), provides: "Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the
judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed
acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business."
3. See text accompanying notes 39-45, 56-61 and 67-71 infra.
4. 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957).
5. See id.
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The History of 28 U.S.C. Section 1400(b) 6
The first United States patent venue statute was enacted in 1897.7
It was enacted to broaden the choice of venue available to patent liti-
gants under the Judiciary Act of 1887.8 The report of the Committee
on Patents of the House of Representatives said simply:
This Bill seeks to define the jurisdiction of the courts in patent
suits and to remove the uncertainty which now arises as to suchjurisdiction by reason of the conflicting decisions of the various
circuit courts. It further facilitates the bringing of suits in the
place of business of the parties interested. It is in the interest of
all and against the interest of none.9
Thus, the first patent venue statute was a harbinger of the changes
eventually wrought by enactment of the general venue statute in 1948.10
The new general provisions liberalized existing law by stating that a cor-
poration could be sued, inter alia, in any judicial district in which it is
doing business. I
The "conflict" referred to in the House Report on the 1897 patent
venue statute had been created by language in In re Hohorst12 which
suggested that patent infringement actions might be controlled by the
general venue provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789.1 Those provi-
sions permitted suit against a defendant in the district of his inhabitance
6. See generally Comment, A New Look at Venue in Patent Infringement
Suits, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 610 (1953); Comment, Venue in Patent Infringement
Suits in the Federal Courts, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 699 (1952); 26 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
117 (1957); 43 VA. L. REV. 109 (1957); 11 VAND. L. REV. 228 (1957).
7. Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (formerly § 48 of the Judicial Code
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 109 (1940)).
8. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552 (formerly § 51 of the Judicial
Code codified at 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1940)). This restrictive federal venue statute pro-
vided: "[N]o civil suit shall be brought ... against any person ... in any other district
than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on
the fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only
in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant ....... The
1897 provision allowed, in addition, the bringing of a patent infringement suit "in the
district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which the de-
fendant . . . shall have committed acts of infringement and have a regular and es-
tablished place of business." Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (formerly §
48 of the Judicial Code codified at 28 U.S.C. § 109 (1940)).
9. H.R. REP. No. 2905, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. (1897).
10. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 935, as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1391
(1970).
11. Id. § 1391(c) provides: "A corporation may be sued in any judicial dis-
trict in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and
such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue
purposes."
12. 150 U.S. 653 (1893).
13. Id. at 660-61.
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or where he could be found for service of process.' 4 This was obvi-
ously broader than the Judiciary Act of 1887, which restricted general
venue to places of inhabitance.' 5 The suggestion in Hohorst had been
adopted by several circuit courts prior to 1897, when the first patent
venue statute was adopted.'6
Between 1897 and 1948, the attitude of both Congress and the
courts became increasingly more favorable to expansion and liberali-
zation of venue in civil cases. 7  This was particularly so with regard
to venue as to corporate defendants, culminating in the enactment of
the present section 1391(c). That statute provides that any judicial
district in which a corporation "is incorporated . . . licensed to do
business or is doing business . . . shall be regarded as the residence
of such corporation for venue purposes."' 8  The patent venue statute,
section 1400(b), enacted at precisely the same time, provides that
"[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judi-
cial district where the defendant resides" or, alternatively, where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
established place of business.' 9 It would seem rather remarkable to
a person untrained in the law that the Supreme Court could interpret
the word "resides" in section 1400(b)-a venue statute-differently
from the manner prescribed in section 1391(c), where "resides" was
defined "for venue purposes." It is scarcely less remarkable to a law-
yer that the Court was able to do just that in Fourco.
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp.2"
In Fourco the Supreme Court held that section 1400(b) does not
supplement section 1391(c). Section 1400(b) is not to be read con-
sistently with section 1391(c) with regard to the meaning of corporate
residence. 2' This holding is all the more remarkable because it re-
jected and reversed an excellent analysis by Chief Judge Clark writing
for the Second Circuit.2   The foundation of the Supreme Court's deci-
14. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 79.
15. See note 8 supra.
16. E.g., Earl v. Southern Pac. Ry., 75 F. 609 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896); Noonan
v. Chester Park Athletic Club Co., 75 F. 334 (C.C.S.D. Ohio, W.D. 1896); National
Button Works v. Wade, 72 F. 298 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896).
17. See. e.g., Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
See generally C. WRIGHT, LAw oF FEERAL CotnTs 149-59 (2d ed. 1963).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970).
19. Id. § 1400(b) (emphasis added).
20. 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
21. Id. at 225-29.
22. Transmirra Products Corp. v. Fourco Glass Co., 233 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1956).
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sion was an uncritical reading of an earlier decision. In Stonite Prod-
ucts Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co.,23 the Court faced the question of whether
it should apply the 1897 patent venue statute2 4 or a different special
venue statute. The latter authorized a transitory action to be brought
in the judicial district wherein any one defendant resided when two or
more defendants resided in different districts within the same state. 25
Application of the special venue statute would have allowed venue
over one codefendant, an inhabitant of the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania, in the Western District of Pennsylvania. The suit was brought
there because the other codefendant was an inhabitant of that district.
The Stonite Court simply held that the venue statute applying to patent
infringement actions-itself a special venue provision-could not be
supplemented by another special venue statute.26 Unfortunately, the
Court continued beyond the facts saying that its decision was based on
an absence of congressional intent that the patent venue statute "dove-
tail with the general provisions relating to the venue of civil suits
"27
Even though Stonite was only concerned with special venue stat-
utes, this language concerning general venue provisions was used by
the Supreme Court to justify its conclusion in Fourco that the present
patent venue statute is an exception from the general venue provi-
sions.28 Thus, the court's incorrect characterization in Stonite was
adopted without adequate analysis in Fourco. This error was com-
pounded by the apparent view of the Court in Fourco that the patent
venue statute of 1897 was intended to be a limitation on, rather than
a broadening, of the then general venue statute. 29  Such a view is di-
rectly opposite to fact.3" Indeed, at the time the patent venue statute
of 1897 was being considered by the Congress, it was recognized as
favoring patent litigants over others. One member of the House of
Representatives said on the floor:
I am glad to see that it recognizes the right of property in patents,
and while I think the bill travels, perhaps, a little out of the
23. 315 U.S. 561 (1942).
24. Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695 (formerly § 48 of the Judicial
Code codified at 28 U.S.C. §109 (1940)). See note 8 supra.
25. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1101, §§ 51-52, (formerly 28 U.S.C.
§ 113 (1940) now 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1970)).
26. 315 U.S. at 566-67.
27. Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
28. 353 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1957).
29. Id. at 225.
30. See notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text supra.
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way and puts the owner of a patent in a little better position
than the owner of any other kind of property . . . I welcome
this bill .... 31
As the basis for rejecting the Second Circuit's view that the defi-
nition of corporate residence stated in the general venue statute should
be read into the word "resides" in the patent venue statute,32 the Su-
preme Court in Fourco relied heavily on the revisor's notes. These
notes suggested that the words "resident" and "inhabitant" are synon-
omous as to venue.33 This suggestion by the revisor was entirely un-
illuminating with regard to whether corporate residence should be uni-
formly interpreted as provided in section 1391(c). In fact, the notes
were so uninformative and ambiguous that the Second Circuit drew
precisely the opposite inference from that drawn by the Supreme
Court. 3 4  Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Fourco took an addi-
tional step in no way suggested by these notes. The Court held that the
word "inhabitant" was limited to place of domicile.3 5 For a corpora-
tion, that is the state of incorporation-a place which can be, and often
is, entirely remote to the jurisdiction where the claim arose and to any
jurisdiction where the corporation does business and is a resident under
section 1391(c). In relying on the revisor's notes, the Court failed
to heed its own warning against giving undue weight to such notes as
pronounced in Ex parte Collett.30 Justice Harlan, an astute proce-
dural authority, filed a dissent endorsing the decision of the Court of
Appeals and calling attention to the warnings of Collett.17
Professor Moore has agreed with Justice Harlan. He says of the
Fourco decision:
With the utmost deference, we believe that the opinion of the
Supreme Court was unsound and that the Court of Appeals was
correct. The Revisor's Note to § 1391 does not indicate that any
change in the general venue statute was intended. But subsection(c) is a new and novel extension of venue pertaining to corpo-
rations. In the same way the Revisor's Note to § 1400 does not
indicate a change from former § 109, but is this to say that
other sections of the Code, particularly the newly incorporated,
can not have any effect upon § 1400? The incorporation
of § 1391(c) in the venue provisions by Congress demonstrated
an intent that a corporation- should be sued where it creates lia-
31. 29 CONG. Rc. 1902 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1897) (emphasis added).
32. 233 F.2d at 886.
33. 353 U.S. at 226.
34. 233 F.2d at 886.
35. 353 U.S. at 226.
36. 337 U.S. 55, 61-71 (1949).
37. 353 U.S. at 229.
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bilities. No special protection of corporate patent infringers seems
intended.3 8
Against this background, we turn now to the treatment of Fourco in
subsequent decisions.
The Partial Erosion of Fourco
Treatment of Other Special Venue Statutes
With considerable prescience, the Second Circuit recognized in its
Fourco decision that the rule proposed to it and ultimately adopted by
the Supreme Court would work mischief with other special venue stat-
utes.39 Notable among these special venue statutes is that contained
in the Jones Act which provides that venue shall be limited to "the dis-
trict in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal
office is located."40  Nine years after Fourco, this problem arose in
Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez.4' In that case, the defendant argued that the
decision in Fourco required that the word "resides" in the venue provi-
sion of the Jones Act be read as precluding venue in a judicial district
in which it merely did business, but was not domiciled.42 Interest-
ingly, the venue provision of the Jones Act had been enacted prior to
the enactment of 28 U.S.C. section 1391 (c). The plaintiff in Suarez
conceded that as enacted and originally interpreted the act would not
authorize venue in a district other than a corporate defendant's domi-
cile. Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous court, repeated his en-
dorsement of the decision by the Court of Appeals in Fourco. He con-
cluded that enactment of section 1391(c) changed the operative
meaning of the venue provision in the Jones Act to include the place
of doing business as the residence of corporate defendants.43 The deci-
sion by the Supreme Court in Fourco was distinguished on the ground
that the patent venue statute of 1897 was enacted "specifically to nar-
row venue in such suits" 44-a plain misreading of history. Indeed, the
rationale of Suarez rested upon the notion that it could be said "with
reasonable certainty that the [venue] provision [of the Jones Act]
was intended to liberalize venue. . . .,,4 Thus, it would appear that
38. 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1632 (2d ed. 1972).
39. 233 F.2d at 888.
40. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
41. 384 U.S. 202 (1966).
42. Id. at 203.
43. Id. at 204.
44. Id. at 207.
45. Id.
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had the Court correctly understood the legislative history of patent
venue, it would have reached an opposite conclusion in Fourco.
Declaratory Judgment Actions in Patent Cases
It is an old adage in the law that there should be mutuality of
remedy and relief as between plaintiff and defendant. While this adage
is not all encompassing, Fourco produced an opposite, and unjust re-
sult, as to patent venue. One who is charged with patent infringement
is entitled to bring an action for declaratory judgment.4 6 When such
an action is brought, venue is not limited to the accused infringer's
domicile or a place where he has a regular and established place of
business and commits acts of infringement. Rather it is controlled by
section 1391(c). The action can be brought wherever the patent
owner can be found within the meaning of the general venue statute.4 7
Declaratory judgment actions by patent owners for threatened in-
fringement have met a less kind fate. A suit for conventional patent
infringement cannot be brought until there has been a completed in-
fringement.48 Accordingly, in some cases patent owners have instituted
declaratory judgment actions for threatened patent infringement. There
was an initial judicial receptiveness to the proposition that such actions
are not controlled by the patent venue statute, since they are not ac-
tions for patent infringement.4 9 However, even though the courts en-
tertained the declaratory relief actions, once the threats had reached
fruition and actual infringement was taking place, the courts, in obvi-
ous deference to the implacable command of Fourco with regard to
patent infringement venue, either dismissed the action" or transferred
it to the district where the defendant corporation had been incorpo-
rated. 1 The Ninth Circuit apparently takes the harsher view that such
declaratory judgment actions should not be permitted in the first
place.5 2
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1971).
47. See, e.g., General Tire and Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 326 F.2d 926 (4th Cir.
1964).
48. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Plymouth Rubber Co., 178 F. Supp. 591
(N.D. Ill. 1959); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Permutit Co., 114 F. Supp. 846 (D. Del. 1953).
49. See Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 290 F. Supp. 122
(S.D. Tex. 1968); Proler Steel Corp. v. Luria Bros. & Co., 223 F. Supp. 87 (S.D. Tex.
1963).
50. Proler Steel Corp. v. Luria Bros. & Co., 225 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Tex. 1964).
51. Fedtro, Inc. v. Chadwick-Miller, Inc., 166 U.S.P.Q. 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Hydro-Clear Corp. v. Aer-o-Flo Corp., 317 F. Supp. 1317 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
52. Swedlow, Inc. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 455 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1972).
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The Single Defendant Who Commits Different Types
of Infringement in Different Districts
Infringement of a patent results from making, using, or selling the
patented invention. 53 In the case of a patent owner who obtains
claims to a process of manufacture and the product of that process,
the process claims are infringed only in the district where the process
is used,54 whereas the product claims are infringed not only where the
product is made, i.e., where the process is practiced, but also where
the product is sold.5 Where process and product are closely related,
it is not infrequent that the Patent Office allows both process and prod-
uct claims in a single patent. Such a patent was the subject of suit
in General Foods Corp. v. Carnation Co., which was brought in the
district where the product was sold but not where the process was
used." Defendant urged that the case should be dismissed as to the
process claims or transferred to a district where it practiced the proc-
ess. The court declined to do so on the ground that there was unques-
tionable venue as to the product claims and that it would create an
intolerable situation to dismiss or transfer the claim as to only the proc-
ess and permit piecemeal litigation to ensue. 57
The court, relying on Hum v. Oursler,5" implicitly created a new
type of pendent jurisdiction. Hum held that federal jurisdiction cannot
be extended by a rule of court.59 The subsequent treatment of pendent
jurisdiction in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs6" affords no additional
support for basing the holding in Carnation on that doctrine. Indeed,
Hum goes only to jurisdiction, not venue, and then only to non-federal
causes of action joined with a related federal claim. Federal jurisdic-
tion was unquestioned in Carnation. It was venue which was in issue.
Thus, the conclusion would appear inescapable that the court in Carna-
tion recognized that application of Fourco would create a result so
53. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1970).
54. Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform, Inc., 449 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1971).
55. General Food Corp. v. Carnation Co., 411 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 532.
58. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
59. Id. at 242. Hum found pendent jurisdiction present when the trial court
had acquired jurisdiction of a cause of action alleging both federal and nonfederal
grounds. Even though the federal grounds were dismissed, the Court permitted
retention of jurisdiction on the pendent, nonfederal ground. This rule was later codi-
fied in 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1971).
60. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). There the court held that pendent jurisdiction exists
whenever the relationship between a federal and non-federal claims permits the con-
clusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one case.
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foolish and wasteful of judicial resources that it simply refused to follow
Fourco, sub silentio.61
However, in virtually indistinguishable situations where patent
owners sued on two patents, one directed to the product and one di-
rected to the process, the courts have considered themselves bound by
Fourco. While the evil of piecemeal litigation perceived in Carnation
could be no less in these cases, the courts have followed the literal
strictures of patent venue and ignored the general venue provisions. 2
Infringement by Aliens
Section'1391(d) of Title 28 provides that "[a]n alien may be
sued in any district." Alien corporations which have no regular and
established place of business in the United States are beyond the reach
of section 1400(b).13 They can and do, however, infringe United
States patents by marketing patented products in this country. In
Coulter Electronics, Inc. v. A.B. Lars Liungberg and Co.,6" the same
court which later managed to avoid Fourco in Carnation held, in effect,
that alien corporations could immunize themselves from suit for patent
infringement by refraining from setting up a regular and established
place of business in the United States. 65  The reasoning was that be-
cause Fourco permitted reliance on no venue statute other than 1400
(b) in a patent infringement action, 1391 (d) must be ignored. Thus
the patent owner was left with a right without a remedy, a condition
repugnant to our system of jurisprudence.
Indeed, this condition was so repugnant to each succeeding court
which had occasion to consider the question that several district court
judges simply refused to follow Fourco, ruling that a patent infringe-
61. Carnation may, however, mark an emerging judicial receptiveness to some-
thing akin to "pendent venue" in cases in which compelling circumstances exist. See
also National Steel Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 160 U.S.P.Q. 521 (D. Md. 1968),
in which claims of inducing infringement, under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), and con-
tributory infringement, under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), were made. The court found that
acts of infringement sufficient to lay venue under section 1400(b) were clearly shown
as to inducing infringement, but that such acts were not clearly shown as to contribu-
tory infringement. The court avoided the impact of "Fourco by finding that sufficient
acts of contributory infringement had occurred within its jurisdiction, but it would
clearly appear that it was strongly motivated by an unwillingness to "unduly frag-
mentize" the litigation.
62. See Schroeder v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 326 F. Supp. 594 (C.D.
Cal. 1971); Lyon v. General Motors Corp., 200 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1971) at note 2 supra.
64. 376 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1967).
65. Id. at 746.
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ment action could be brought against an alien corporation under sec-
tion 1391(d)." The matter came to a head in Brunette Machine
Works Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc.6 7
In Brunette, the Supreme Court recognized, for the first time, that
the patent venue statute of 1897 liberalized venue in patent infringe-
ment actions as compared with the then applicable general venue stat-
ute. The Court further recognized the irony of the interpretation
placed on section 1400(b) in Fourco which left patent owners in a
less favored position than general litigants. However, despite all this,
the Court refused to recognize the folly of Fourco. The Brunette deci-
sion was couched in terms of electing between two special venue stat-
utes and section 1391(d) was chosen as the applicable venue provision.
This methodology was reminiscent of Stonite. 8 Quite obviously, the
Court was unwilling to work a manifest injustice by deciding otherwise.
Its refusal, nonetheless, to undo the mischief of Fourco under the most
compelling circumstances was unfortunate.69
Patent Actions Other Than Patent Infringement
The courts have demonstrated a decided willingness to permit
patent owners to avoid the impact of Fourco in those cases where the
complaint is framed as other than patent infringement. The leading
case is Koratron Company, Inc. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,"° in which
the patent owner claimed that the defendant had interfered with pro-
spective business relationships by advertising that use of defendant's
fabrics in a patented process would avoid infringement. Precisely the
same facts would have been ample basis for suit for inducement of in-
fringement under 35 U.S.C. section 271(b), in which case section
1400(b) and Fourco would have been applicable. The court held
that the plaintiff is the master of its cause of action. By drawing its
complaint so as to exclude reliance on the patent infringement statute,
66. Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Vecchioni, 168 U.S.P.Q. 59 (E.D. Va.
1970); Charles Pfizer and Co. v. Laboratori Pro-Ter Prodotti Therapeutici, 278 F. Supp.
148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. Molins Organizations, Ltd.,
261 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Va. 1966).
67. 406 U.S. 706, 174 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1972). The Supreme Court upheld a Ninth
Circuit decision, 442 F.2d 420 (1971), which rejected this quasi alien immunity.
68. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
69. See also Annot., 12 A.L.R. Fed. 502 (1972) for a discussion of patent venue
as to alien infringers. This includes an analysis of what constitutes a "regular and
established place of business" within the meaning of section 1400(b), but the anno-
tation was published prior to Brunette.
70. 418 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1969).
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the plaintiff could avoid the requirement of 1400(b) as prescribed in
Fourco.71
The Rule of Fourco Lives On
In addition to the cases where an action for infringement of a
process patent required trial separate from an action for infringement
of a product patent,72 the rule of Fourco was applied in a manner con-
ducive to piecemeal litigation in Koratron Co. v. Lion Uniform Inc. 73
In that case, the owner of a process patent was faced with many actions
involving the same patent. All of the actions had been brought in or
were subsequently transferred to and consolidated in the District Court
for the Northern District of California.' The defendant, Lion Uni-
form, allegedly practiced the patented process only in Kentucky and
was an Ohio corporation. However, it sold the product of the allegedly
patented process within the jurisdiction of the court in the Northern
District of California where suit was brought. The court refused to
include the sale of the finished product as part of the use of the pat-
ented process, refused to find any erosion of Fourco in Carnation, and
refused to find proper venue as to defendant Lion. Thus, in an odd
counterpoint, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply Fourco to alien in-
fringers in Brunette,75 but felt bound by Fourco to require piece-
meal litigation in Lion whereas the Seventh Circuit refused to permit
suit against an alien corporation because of Fourco,76 but ignored
Fourco to avoid piecemeal litigation in Carnation.77
Conclusion
The demonstrable fact is that the decision in Fourco was based
on faulty historical analysis and would have reached the opposite result
if the history of the patent venue statutes had been properly perceived.
Fourco serves no identifiable policy interest and is considered unsound
by the author of the most authoritative text on federal civil procedure.
The Supreme Court itself -considers the decision ironical. Addition-
ally, Fourco has imposed much unnecessary litigation on the courts,
71. Id. at 1317-18.
72. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
73. 449 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1971).
74. See Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 326 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Cal. 1971);
In re Koratron, 302 F. Supp. 239 (1969) (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation).
75. See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
77. See note 67 and text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
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including piecemeal litigation. Finally, it puts patent owners at a dis-
advantage when their venue rights are compared to those of general
litigants and patent infringers. Any one of the foregoing would be
adequate basis for foregoing Fourco; two or three provide compelling
basis for doing so; and the aggregate is overwhelming. No matter how
"certain" the Court attempted to be in prescribing patent venue in
Fourco, the fact that it was not "right" has made that decision the tar-
get for repeated attack in the courts. The partial success of those at-
tacks in no way decreases the need to either overrule Fourco or make
it the subject of remedial legislation.
